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THE COST OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE PRICE OF RISK* 
Thomas T. Stout** 
My father has told me more than once about what a fine nose his mother 
had. What impressed him was her keen sense of smell. The story needs tell-
ing now, but to appreciate it we must first recall what a fine, aromatic place 
an old bank barn could be. There were the mows of loose hay, and perhaps 
lumber curing in the lofts; cattle and horses and manure in the lower level; 
there was grease on wooden axles and sweat on harness leather, and the good 
odor of all these familiar things was met and known by all who entered the 
barn. 
I once asked my father what he smoked when he was a kid and after 
specifying everything expected, and adding exotics like Catalpa bean and 
buggy whip, he shrugged and summarized with the words "Anything that would 
burn." So it was that Dad selected the safe, secluded setting of the barn to 
begin experimenting with a pipe; a real pipe. He must have been about eight 
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years old by then because he was gettJng sophisticated with his smok.ing. 
He would puff and smile and put his plpe away high up on a hand-hewn beam 
above the lofts and mows where only he would ever know of it. Except his 
mother found it. In the rich, aromatic atmosphere of that old barn she smelled 
it. She had stepped inside the door and was closing it behind her when she 
stopped. She stood still. Something irregular, something different was in the 
air. I want to tell you now that what she smelled was not smoke but a day-old, 
dead-cold pipe on a beam up high above the hay. She stood there and sniffed 
the o.rnma-laden air like a hound testing the wind and then she began to move--
a little bit this way, and back again over that way. Bye-and-bye she was in 
the mow and pretty soon she had the pipe. 
Dad got a terrific whaling from his father and that is why he still remembers 
the fine nose his mrJ 11.er had. Now whatever lectures might have accompanied 
the whaling, like sins of the flesh and all that, we all know the real reason he 
got his tanning was be•;ause he might have burned the barn down. Who among 
·you has not issued warnings and promised punishments for smoking in the barn? 
We do this because we do not want our barns to burn. Each of us is uncertain 
about whether our barn will burn, but we are sure the likelihood is increased 
if fire is taken inside of it. 
We are dealing here with uncertainty and risk and I am relating an 
entertaining anecdote by way of explaining the title and the content of this 
paper. What I would like to do in the few minutes I have with you is to define 
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uncertainty and risk and show how their changing dimensions have affected 
agriculture and the livestock industry. Then, I will conclude with some 
speculation and forecasts about things that concern you most, like numbers and 
prices and market prospects. 
Uncertainty and Risk 
Uncertainty is no knowledge of what things might happen or when they 
might occur. No man knows if his barn will burn or if it will not. But risk is 
uncertainty to which some probability can be attached. Even insurance companies 
do not know if your barn will burn, but they do know how many in a thousand will 
likely burn in a given time. Insurance is a means of reducing uncertainty to risk. 
Blistering the bottoms of little boys for smoking in the barn is more primitive 
and less effective but it also is a device for reducing uncertainty to risk. The 
cost of uncertainty is the value of the threatened barn. The price of risk is the 
anguish of a spanking or the amount of an insurance payment. 
Uncertainty, Risk, and Survival 
Now, let's rest a bit. Only three things have been said that are worth 
knowing: (1) First, the price of risk usually is seen by rational men to be lower 
than the cost of uncertainty, (2) Second, while all the talk has been about the 
survival of barns, what we really have been talking about is a rule probably 
helpful to the survival of anything, and (3) Third, the constant search for 
probabilities that will lessen the uncertainties of life is so earnestly pursued 
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because the notion of surviva.l is so vital to us all. 
One night John Steinbeck was camped alone in the desert in Southern 
California and the occas ton gave him cause to reflect on the business of survival 
and here is what he said about it: 
When, very late in the history of our planet, the incredible accident 
of life occurred, a balance of chemical factors, combined with tepera-
ture, in quantities and in kinds so delicate as to be unlikely, all came 
together in the retort of time and a new thing emerged, soft and helpless 
and unprotecte,i in the savage world of unlife. Then processes of change 
and variation took place in the organisms, so that one kind became dif-
ferent from all others. But one ingredient, perhaps the most important 
of all, is planted in every life form--the factor of survival. No living 
t11ing is without it, nor could life exist without this magic formula. Of 
course, each form developed its own machinery for survival, and some 
failed and d:lsappeared while others peopled the earth. The first life 
might easily have been snuffed out and the accident may never have 
happened again--but once it existed, its first quality, its duty, pre-
occupation, direction, and end, shared by every living thing, is to go 
on living. Anr:i so it does and so it will until some other accident cancels 
it. And tl-e dE: ~rt, the dry and sun-lashed desert, is a good school in 
which to observs ·he cleverness and the infinite variety of techniques 
of survival under pitiless opposition. Life could not change the sun or 
water the desert, so it changed itself [6]. 
This natural affinit~· for risk, this normal aversion to uncertainty, this 
willingness to change as conditions suggest the wisdom of it, has universal 
applications which prevail in all circumstances save only those occasions when 
some seriously over-riding consideration overwhelms the natural tendency. I 
have heard it employed to explain, even, the survival of war. This occurred 
in an observation made by Henry Kissinger during the closing years of U. S. 
involvement in Southeast Asia. Speaking of a part of the world where, for a 
generation or more, war was better known than was peace, he said one of the 
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difficulties of drawing the war to a close was that the people (and their social 
and political institutions) "preferred the risks of war to the uncertainties of 
peace." 
This preference for risk to uncertainty, then, goes far to explain survival, 
whether one talks of wars, or life, or ancient barns where boys might go to 
smoke. It accounts also for the survival of societies and social institutions and 
other extensions of man and, surely, it accounts for the survival of politicians 
and public bureaucracies. 
Survival, it might be said, is the very process of reducing uncertainty to 
risk. And, being conducive to the self-interest of all that wish to survive, it 
might even be called selfish. In one of his novels, Somerset Maugham has an 
older man instructing a young friend on lessons in survival. The conversation 
occurs in a Parisian left-bank bar: 
"It seems to me an awfully selfish way of looking at things," 
said Philip. 
"But are you under the impression that men ever do anything 
except for selfish reasons?" 
"Yes." 
"It is impossible that they should ••. Man performs actions because 
they are good for him, and when they are good for other people as 
well they are thought virtuous: If he finds pleasure in giving alms he 
is charitable; if he finds pleasure in helping others he is benevolent; 
if he finds pleasure in working for society he is public-spirited; but 
it is for your private pleasure that you give twopence to a beggar as 
much as it is for my private pleasure that I drink another whiskey and 
soda. 11 ••• 
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"But have you never known people to do things they djdn't want 
to instead of things they did? 11 
"No. You put your question foolishly. What you mean is that 
people accept an immediate pain rather than an immediate pleasure •.•• 
It is clear that men (do), but only because they expect a greater 
pleasure in the future. Often the pleasure is illusory, but their 
error in calculation is no refutation of the rule ••.• It is a law of 
creation. If it were possible for men to prefer pa in to plea sure the 
human race would have long since become extinct. 11 [3] 
Now all this business about risk and uncertainty and survival and selfish-
ness seAms logical enough to me and my good sense encourages me to accept 
the reasonableness of it. Yet all around me every day I see people engaged 
in activities and headed in directions that reflect their preference and pleasure 
but do not appear to be conducive to survival.Then I am reminded that 11 Often 
the pleasure is illusory, but their error in calculation is no refutation of the rule. 11 
Examples are n0t hL ,,.J to find in agriculture, and I am left to speculate about 
what might cause people to make "errors in calculation" or to persist in their 
pursuits after it is clear even to them that their prospects for survival are indeed 
unlikely. 
Technology, Art Forms and Errors in Calculation 
What might cause a man to ignore this "law of creation" ? Why might he 
knowingly make this 11 error in calculation" which puts him in the curious category 
of preferring the immediate pain of existence to the ultimate pleasure of extinction? 
What kind of man proclaims on a bumper sticker on his pickup "I'm proud to be 
a farmer" ? Is he proud and happy? Or is he proud and sad? That man who just 
c 
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lectured us in the Paris bar about the "law of creation": listen to an account 
of his own life and see how even he failed by choice to practice what he 
preached and imagine how readily his circumstances might be understood by 
the man with the bumper sticker: 
•.• Cronshaw was very poor. He earned a bare subsistence 
by writing ..• for one or two English papers, and he did a 
certain amount of translating. . •• The life of Paris had got 
into his bones, and he would not change it, notwithstanding 
its squalor, drudgery, and hardship, for any other in the world •.• 
He was a man who would have made a success of life a century 
and a half ago ••• [3] . 
"He would not change it. " How does it come about that the satisfactions 
of some men are conducive to their survival and the satisfactions of others 
are not? I think perhaps a major part of the explanation lies in the constant 
altering of the rules that is an essential feature of rapid change in our modern, 
technological age. Things we supposed were constant are unexpectedly 
discovered to be obsolete, and this includes not only machinery or mechanical 
methods, but also the rules men live by. In some of his writings Marshall 
McLuhan has left an indelible sentence: 
"Whenever technology makes old eras obsolete we always raise 
them to an art form. 11 [ 4] 
It is possible, therefore, for even men to become technologically 
obsolete, and they are left with no choice for their survival but the preservation 
of their identity; their self-perception of who they are. To raise an obsolete 
old era to an "art form" means no more and no less than to preserve obsolete 
preferences in order to preserve obsolete self-identities, even after the 
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prospects for economic profit have long since grown dim and dtsappeared, 
for there is no other identity to preserve. 
I wonder if this might explain as well as anything why some people are 
led by personal preference to make unwise decisions in terms of economic 
consequences. J. K. Galbraith has provided a graphic illustration of the 
consequences of this kind of error in his entertaining but sobering commentary 
on "The Pleasures and Uses of Bankruptcy." [2] What he is talking about, of 
course, is the pleasures that can be gleaned not from the grim business of ones 
own L.solvency proceedings, but from the bankruptcies of others. Briefly, 
Galbraith is examining the "economic underpinnings" of a secluded and rustic 
portion of Vermont where he would spend his summer months. He concluded 
that there was not enough money in farming or local industry to make things go, 
and that the same w,, true of the "summer people" like himself. "We contribute ~ 
something to the economic life, but we are no gold mine, " he wrote. 
"But gradual~y 1 have become aware of another source of revenue / 
which is important. And those who supply it add greatly to the 
comfort, convenie.1ce and pleasure of country life and may even 
make it tolerable. These are the people who systematically disperse 
their saving, money they have inherited or whatever they can borrow, 
on enterprises conducted for the public good. They grow things, make 
useful articles or (most important of all) render valuable services 
which one could never obtain on a purely commercial basis. Their 
prices are not always low, but since they are always selling below 
cost, no one can complain. The community benefits not only from the 
goods and services they supply but also from the rent or interest they 
pay, the purchases they make, and the payrolls they meet. To be 
sure, the day comes when the rent, interest, bills and payroll become 
troublesome or can no longer be met. But invariably others come along. 
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The competition to serve the public at a loss is rather keen. In 
a town not far from here there is an inn which has failed decisively 
in the financial sense not once but twice in the past five years. 
It is now up for sale at the highest price yet. The chances of 
getting the asking price or something close are excellent. On the 
basis of this and other cases, it is my belief that service generally 
improves with each bankruptcy." [2] 
Galbraith thinks jaded New Yorkers who purchase rustic country inns 
provide an excellent example of the unforeseen likelihood of doing business 
for fun instead of for profit with the result of a net benefit to the public of this 
keen competition to do business at a loss. You and I need not look so far 
away. We know such things are frequently found at home in agriculture. Yet 
we seldom laugh at such a man. Though we may disagree with his methods 
we understand his motives to be the same as our own. He struggles to survive; 
it is just that one man 1 s terms of survival are different from another's. 
How a man arrives at a decision that will affect his future depends much 
on the kind of man he is. Economists like to suppose that the only legitimate 
sort of decision-maker is an "economic man," a man who is tirelessly objective 
and rational in response to a profit motive. But there are certain flaws in such 
a man that make his existence less likely than it is convenient for economists 
to suppose. Some of these flaws have been specified by Kenneth Boulding, 
a more-than-normally thoughtful economist, who wrote: 
11 No man in his senses would want his daughter to marry an economic 
man, one who counted every cost and demanded every reward, was 
never afflicted with mad generosity or uncalculating love, and who 
never acted out of a sense of inner identity and indeed had no inner 
identity even if he was occasionally affected by carefully calculated 
considerations of benevolence or malevolence. 11 [l] I I 
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Boulding saw in this convenient but dismal assumption about man the basis 
for rr:uch of the criticism and popular disenchantment focused on economics 
as a science, and he argues reasonably that calculated measurement does 
not exhaust the decision-making capacities of man nor adequately explore 
the nature of man himself. He offers us another kind of man, more like the 
pleasant kind of person all of us have met and liked, and reminds us he is 
a non-economic sDrt of man, one whose existence .is based on subscription 
to some "heroic ethic" in which "the decision-maker elects something, not 
beGa..ise of the effects it will have, but because of what he is; that is, how 
he perceives his own identity." Here is a man who might buy a failing 
country inn or perhaps exhaust himself (with pride) on a thin and failing little 
farm. Between tMs man and the coldly economic man, Boulding summarizes 
the two extremes: 
"My personal view is that, especially at his present stage of 
development, man requires both heroic and economic elements ... 
and the problem ·Jf maintaining them in proper balance and tension 
is one of the m,1jor problems of .•• the individual and of societies. 
Economic man is a clod, heroic man is a fool, but somewhere 
between the clod and the fool, human man, if the expression may 
be pardoned, steers his tottering way." [l] 
Ah, I know this sort of fellow well • Do you not find him in your 
neighborhood also? Perhaps in your house? Human man; a man somewhere 
between the economic man who is a clod because he is not heroic and the 
heroic man who is a fool because he is not economic. The differences 
between us all could be described by our different positions in the spectrum 
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C that spans the two extremes. And all of us, with all our differences in these 
dimensions populate the agricultural landscape and affect its future. Let us 
see, now, how we are divided and how we are affecting the outcome of agri-
culture in the struggle between our economic and our heroic aspirations; our 
cloddish and our foolish extremes. 
Survival and Agriculture 
Sometimes I have to acknowledge that I am aging, after all: An example 
is that I can remember the early and mid-fifties with a clarity that makes me 
suppose those were recent years. Do you remember when a Farmall M was a 
real tractor and a Super MD was just about the biggest thing around? It seemed 
like most people were aware that some sort of big change was supposed to be 
coming in agriculture, but they all thought it meant Super M's had replaced 
horses and something else would replace the M's and if that was all there'd 
be to it, then it was nothing to get alarmed about. Seemed like most people 
had fairly decent farms and if they didn't they weren't too worried about their 
prospects. They had a couple cows and a couple sows, and they all had names 
and they all were pets . 
The 1954 Census of Agriculture tells me my memory hasn't failed me yet 
(Table 1). Nearly two-thirds of all farms sold cattle that year, and more than 
a million farms sold one to four head, maybe Bossy, Brownie, Bessie and Pet. 
I' v~ got a table here in my notes that you can see if you want a copy of the paper. 
Table 1: Thousands of U. S. Farms Selling Cattle, Thousands of Cattle Sold, and 
Cattle Sold Per Farm (Calves Excluded), Census Years, 1954, 
Farms Selling Cattle 
1954 1964 
(Thousands) 
1 - 4 1,028 616 
5 - 19 594 478 
20 - 49 157 152 
50 - 99 47 59 
100 - 199 20 32 
200 or more 12 17.9/ 
500 or more ----- 6 
1000 or more ----- -----
Total All FarmsY 1,859 1,360 
g/ Class size becomes 200-499 head 
.QI Class size becomes 500-999 head 
fl Alaska and Hawaii excluded. 
1969 
286 
362 
134 
52 
30 
20.9! 
5!2/ 
3 
892 
1964 and 1969 
Total S'.lles 1 1964 Total Sales 1 1969 
rumber Percent Number Percent 
(OOO' (OOO) 
1,349 3.8 696 1. 7 
4,445 12.8 3,476 8.4 
4,532 13.1 3,972 9.7 
3,965 11.5 3,494 8.5 
4,234 12.2 4,048 9.8 
4,833.9/ 14.o.9/ 5,767.9/ 14.o.9/ 
11,248 32.6 3,431!2/ 8.3!2/ 
------ ----- 16,247 40.0 
34,606 100.0 41,131 100.0 
SOURCE: U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1964, Vol. II, Chapter2; U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1969, 
Vol. II, Chapter 2. 
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Down the left column it shows me the number of cattle sold per farm, and the 
next columns show me the number of farms selling that number of cattle in 
1954, 1964 and 1969. Listen to these sale size classes: 1 to 4 head; 5-19; 
20-49; 50-99; and 100-199. Then the column gets interesting. In 1954 it 
concludes with the biggest outfits of all: 200 head or more. But in 1964, 
ten years later, they had to change the first column to read 200-499 and then 
they tried again for the biggest outfits of all: 500 head or more. Just five 
years later, by 1969, the futility of that class size was evident also, and the 
biggest size was upped to 1000 head or more. 
Now let me tell you three interesting things about this table you can't 
see; three things that help describe what happened in just 15 years: (1) First, 
over a million farms sold 1-4 cattle in 1954, but by 1964 only 616,000 tried it 
and in 1969 only 286, 000 were still in there. In 1964 these little farms accounted 
for 3. 8 percent of all cattle sold; five years later they accounted for 1. 7 percent 
of cattle sales in 1969. (2) Second, it wasn't just the smallest outfits that 
declined in numbers during these 15 years. The number of farms that sold 5-19 
head went down also; and so did the 20-49 size, and in just the last five years, 
the same thing happened to the 50-99 size and the 100-199 size. Consider 
that: In just 15 years the only cattle farms that stayed off the endange·ed species 
list were the ones that sold 200 head or more! (3) Now th.ird, and finally, 
what happened to the biggest outfits? Well, in 1954 the big ones were the 
20\J head and more outfits, remember? Out of l, 859, 000 farms selling cattle 
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that year there were only 12, 000 farms that big. But in 1964 the blggest 
farms sold 500 head or more and there were only 6, 000 of them in a total of 
1, 360, 000 farms sell.ing cattle (that• s less than half of one percent) but they 
accounted for 32. 6 percent of all cattle sold. Did you hear that? In 19 64 
one-half of 1 percent of all farms selling cattle accounted for nearly one-third 
of all ca.ttle sales. Now, let's look at 1969 and when we do this let• s remember 
that 1969 was seven years ago and I leave it to you to speculate about what 
1975 must have looked like or what 1980 might bring. By 1969 there were 
still 392, 000 farms selling cattle. (That's way less than half the number that 
sold cattle 15 years before.) But of that 892, 000 the biggest farms were the 
ones that sold 1000 cattle or more and there were only 3000 farms like that in 
the whole United States. They represented about one-third of one percent of 
all farms selling c,', 1 e in 1969 and they accounted for 40 .0 percent of all 
cattle sold! 
So in the pas-:: 1 r; years a lot of heroic men bit the dust because they 
were too foolish to be economic about the cattle business, and probably not 
too many successful survivors came to this convention in 1976 to mourn their 
passing. If you are concerned it is maybe that no one will recall your name 
at the convention a few years hence, but that dismal prospect is best considered 
next Monday morning and not today. Instead, be kind to me now, and 
generous with your attention, while I review another table that summarizes 
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the obvious explanation for changes found in Table 1. I have here a summary 
of the development of the commercial cattle feeding industry for some years 
since 1962 (Table 2). What this table does is give us a proxy of commercial 
feedlot development by dividing total U. S. feedlots into two categories; those 
with less than 1000 head capacity and those with more. That's a fairly gross 
measure, but little more than a decade is needed to show that it is sharp enough. 
In 1962 it was estimated that there were in the United States about 236, 000 
things that could be called feedlots. Of these I 234 I 500 had less than 1000 
head capacity and about 1, 500 had capacity to feed more than 1000 head, and 
these big ones accounted for less than one percent of the total number of lots. 
Yet in that year, 1962, the handful of 1000-head-or-more lots produced more 
than one-third of all fed cattle and the quarter-million other feedlots produced 
the other two-thirds. Gentlemen, that was 13 years ago. Today, 100, 000 
of those "little" lots have disappeared and, despite the ravages of recent 
years, 1, 764 of the big ones survived to be counted in 1975 and the output 
figures today are reversed. Less than 2, 000 lots now provide two-thirds of 
the fed beef supply and 136, 000 of the smaller ones compete to supply the 
remaining third. The large lots never accounted for as much as 2 percent of 
the total and more often their number was closer to 1 or 1 1/2 percent. Yet 
in 13 years they doubled their share of total output and witnessed the demise 
of 100, 000 smaller efforts which, typically, were the supplementary enterprises 
thc.t populated the landscape of family-·farm agriculture. 
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Table 2: Number of Cattle Feedlots and Fed Cattle Marketings by Size of 
Feedlots, Principal Feeding, States, U.S. 1962-1975 
-
-
Feedlots More Tha_n l, 000 Capacity _Feedlots Less Than 1i000 Head Ca12acity 
Cattle Percentage of Cattle Percentage of 
Number Marketed All Cattle Number Marketed All Cattle 
Year of Lots (1, 000 Head) Marketed of Lots (l ,000 Head) Marketed 
1962 1,517 5,572 36.5 234,646 9,689* 63.5 
1963 1,579 6, 118 37.6 230,825 10,156* 62.4 
1964 1,668 7,050 38.9 223,071 11,094 61.1 
1965 1,787 7 I 941 42.4 220,164 10,777 57.6 
1966 1,921 9,026 44.3 215,296 11, 336 55.7 
1967 2,034 9,822 45.3 209,581 11, 874 54.7 
1968 2,080 10,823 47.0 206,516 12,217 53.0 
1969** 2,181 12,688 51.5 198,200 11, 957 48.5 
1970*** 2,?42 13,675 55.0 181,508 11, 205 45.0 
1971 2,205 14,761 58.4 163,032 10,520 41. 6 
1972 2, 107 16,536 61. 7 152,429 10,275 38.3 
1973 2,040 16,363 64.6 144,380 8,968 35.4 
1974 1,922 15,069 65.0 135,815 8,261 35.0 
1975 1,764 13,219 65.0 136,262 7,275 35.0 
*Two estimating series f, ~ort marketings before and after 1964. The early series ~ 
reports 1962-64 marketings at i4.361, 15.314, and 17 .074 million head. The later series 
reports 1964 at 18 .144 million head, 6. 27 percent higher. The figures were adjusted by 
6.27 percent in the older series to 15.261, 16.274, and 18.144 million head. 
**Marketings are reported for 32 states through 1968. In 1969, marketings from. 
feedlots with more than 1, 000 h~ad were reported for 22 states. Figures for 1969 reported 
here include 1968 data for 10 states excluded from 1969 report. In the 22 states reported, 
feedlots with more than 1, 000 head marketed 51. 8 percent of total. 
***Twenty-three states only for 1970 and subsequent years. 
SOURCES: For fed cattle marketings in feedlots with less than 1, 000 head in 1962-63, 
annual supplements to Livestock and Meat Statistics, Statistical Bulletin 333, SRS, USDA, 
July, 1963. For all other 1962-66 data, Number of Cattle Feedlots by Size Groups, SRS-14, 
Crop Reporting Board, SRS, USDA, July, 1968. For 1967-70 data, Cattle on Feed, Crop 
Reporting Board, SRS, USDA, January issues 1969-71. For 1971-72 data, Livestock and 
Meat Statistics, ERS/SRS, USDA, Statistical Bulletin No. 522, June, 1974. For 1974-1975 
estimates, Cattle on Feed, USDA. 
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This dividing-up of agriculture between the big and the little is not 
confined to cattle feeding, and this fact is well known to us all. But you 
might be surprised by the extent of it. I have one more table here and in the 
briefest possible terms it can be summarized in this way: The last published 
Census data show us that in 1969 there were in the United States 2, 971, 000 
farms. But, of these, only 211,000 farms, just 7 percent, realized more than 
half the total ca sh receipts from farming and, on the other side of the coin, 
more than half of all farms in the nation shared collectively only 5 percent of 
all cash receipts and enjoyed a negative return on their investment for the 
effort (Table 3) • "The competition to serve the public at a loss is rather keen." 
It is clear that we have some difficulties here. One of them, it is 
obvious, lies in what the Census calls a farm. A simple redefinition could 
cause the instant disappearance of many unnecessary farms. But the difficulty 
is more than a matter of mere definition when over half of what is defined is 
in trouble. What is simple is to suppose that when a man has gangrene in one 
leg the solution to his problem is to change the definition of legs so that he 
may continue to enjoy his health. 
The difficulties are more serious. I find that I dwell on them, though it 
embarrasses me to repeat to one audience what I have already said to another. 
Yet last May I bothered a California audience with my concerns [7] and, more 
recently, I said the same things to a group of patient Canadians [8]. The 
ditriculties are analogous to those of the man with a problem in his leg. Gangrene 
spreads. Novv here I summarize again what appears to me to be a rather significant 
set of events <J.nd con sequences. 
Table 3: Number of Farms, Cash Receipts from Farming and Realized Net Farm Income 
by Economic Class, United States, 1969 
Cash Receipts Av. Govt. Realized Net Total Net Return 
Economlc Class Farms From FarmingW Payment Farm Income.QI Family on 
Number Percent Per Farm Percent Per Farm Per Farm Percent IncomdY InvestmentW 
(000) 
All Farms, Total 2,971 100.0 $ 17,174 100.0 $1,277 $ 5,437 100 .0 $10,693 
"Adequate" Farms 
$40 ,000 or more 211 7 .1 123,744 51.3 5,280 27,503 0S.9 32,967 10 .5% 
$20,000 to $39,999 357 12.0 30 440 21 2,630 10,466 23.1 13,707 9.2% 
"Intermediate" Farms 
$10,000 to $19,999 505 17.0 16,172 16.0 1,788 6,481 20.3 9,622 5. 7% 
$ 5 I 000 to $ 9,999 389 13.1 8,309 6.3 954 3,630 8.7 8, 118 3.0% 
"Inadequate" Farms 
$ 2 ! 5 0 0 to $ 4 I 9 9 9 286 9.6 4,300 2.4 615 2,122 3.8 7,017 - 0.4% 
Less than $2, 500 1,223 41. 2 1,159 2.7 238 1,082 8.2 8,093 - 3.5% 
§,! Total cash receipts were $51,023,000,000 
QI Includes government payments and an average of about $875 of non-money income from food and housing 
fl' Is realized net farm income plus off-farm earnings by all family members 
g/ Includes inflationary value on farm land and is for 1967 
SOURCE: Farm Income Situation, July, 1970 
6i . 
..... 
co 
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Technological change came upon post-World War II agriculture with 
unexpected swiftness. Its force is far from spent. Technological demands of 
cost and complexity translated quickly into efficiency related to size. Bigger 
equipment, for example, could be kept efficiently occupied only over greater 
acreage. Two things occurred: A few buyers consolidated larger farms from 
many sellers, and agricultural specialization began to replace the crop rotation 
of Farmall M agriculture. 
Perhaps the greatest uncertainty faced in agriculture is the uncertainty 
of price change. With the advent of crop specialization, the cost of uncertainty 
rose dramatically for individual farmers, and the increasing size and complexity 
of ever more sophisticated technology drove up the price of risk as well. How-
ever great the unbearable uncertainty became, not all those who encountered 
the cost were able to afford the alternative. The price of remaining an economic 
man in agriculture was soon beyond the reach of most and beyond the inclination 
of many. 
Agriculture quickly began to lose any unifying qualities of brotherhood it 
might once have had and soon became characterized by new dimensions of 
divisiveness as heroic men and economic men began to choose up sides. Social 
and political unity became eroded. Agricultural specialization soon mec.nt that 
one man's income became his neighbor's costs when one raised grain and another 
fed cattle. Choices were made by some in favor of modern science and by others 
for a traditional pace and life [5] . 
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Today, agriculture is economically and politically a small, remote 
and fragmented consideration in the view of a vast urbon majority that is un-
able to gain a clear uEderstanding of agriculture and its problems from the 
babel of contradictory agricultural spokesmen. By default, a divided agri-
culture is forfeiting its opportunity for an effective political voice in its own 
destiny and our problems are resolved for us by City People who are not without 
concern for their t::;wn primary preoccupations. 
TJ.,e divisiveness that is harbored in agriculture bespeaks a fundamental 
probLm that transcends the small forecasts for an immediate future that I am 
about to make. Most of us have a regard for agriculture that is greater than 
a respect for what it can do; we like it also for what it is. We identify with 
the identity of it. It must be that the economic and heroic differences among 
us are related to out ::gard for agriculture in its varying capacities for what 
it can do as opposed to what it is or has already done. But the future is the 
same for all of us ar~d for agriculture. Our problems lie not with a future we 
cannot understand but ·vith a future we understand all too well. Our problems 
lie in being willing to do what we know we must do.1/ 
1/The phrasing of this thought, and perhaps the thought itself, is 
prompted by recollection of a Peter Marshall sermon recorded by Caedmon 
Records, TCR 101, and copyright in 1955 by Catherine Marshall. 
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~ Forecasts and Expectations 
Last year I came to Fresno and forecast some prices and market condi-
tions for the 1975 harvest season and for cattle and hogs late into the year. 
As I recall, May, 19 7 5, was a time of great uncertainty and I am gratified 
now that my forecasts were no worse than they were. Corn and wheat and 
soybeans turned out about right, and so did nitrogen prices, and I had fourth 
quarter cattle prices about right. But hogs did better, for longer, than I 
expected, and calves barely came up to what I forecast and then only briefly 
and way too late to do many people any good. 
This is still a sensitive year because we worry about drought and be-
cause worldwide carryover stocks are small. Hence, prices are going to be 
very sensitive to any bit of news which even might have a bearing on market 
conditions later in the year. Still, I find this an easier year than 19 7 5 to 
forecast. 
Perhaps I feel more at ease because the underlying tendencies I spoke 
of last year are predictably still there as I had said they would be nearly a 
year ago. It is still possible to say that oil prices will remain high. It is 
still possible to say that interest rates and unemployment and inflation will 
remain higher than standards we had been taught were norms a decade or less 
ago. It is now possible to say that while unemployment may lessen, interest 
rates and inflation may by 1977 have turned upward again. One reason why 
this is true is that it is rea~;onable to understand that over time interest rates 
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must outpace inflation rates, and there are grounds for supposing that inflation 
will increase. A.side from other reasons, one basis for expecting a rising in-
flation rate is what we may expect in terms of rising food costs, and food costs 
will rise because agricultural prices are going to rise. Here are some reasonable 
expectations, and because they are reasonable, some rather specific forecasts: 
Nitrogen fertilizer prices have declined to little more than half what they 
were at their peak a year ago. They may decline a little farther yet; production 
capacity has been expanded greatly in recent years and there seems to be the 
assumption that it ought to be expanded more. But the demand that apparently 
is counted on may have been calculated on the basis of the surge in demand 
that accompanied expanded acreage and very high prices a few years back. 
Neither the great 'Xpansion in acreage or the unique circumstances surrounding 
extraordinarily high 1- i.ces is likely to recurr. So it seems safe to suppose 
that nitrogen prices will stay about where they are, or maybe slide a little 
lower, for this crop 1e=.r. 
Now on grains and beans I have a few forecasts which have been reliably 
reported to me by people who are paid to be very professional in their concern 
for such matters. There is a willingness to suppose that wheat will be about 
what it was last year, even though last year we worried that there was too 
much wheat and this year we worry there may be too little. The estimators 
suppose July wheat may be in the $3. 50 to $3. 75 range. Harvest season 
soybeans are being considered at about $4. 50 and a 6. 0 billion bushel corn 
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crop at about $ 2. 50 or perhaps a little stronger. Prices on a larger crop, say 
6.5 billion bushels might range closer to $2.00 to $2.25 and on a smaller crop, 
like 5. 5 billion bushels at something like $ 3. 00. Now on all these matters I 
warn you that I am repeating other people's estimates. I contact such people 
because I consider them to be the most reliable sources I know of. But I am 
not here to guarantee you that I know where the most reliable sources are, nor 
would I guarantee anybody that the most reliable sources on matters like agri-
cultural prices are always right. Nevertheless, I have enough confidence in 
the information and in the sources to think the estimates are worth reportin~r. 
Hogs appear to be in a position to enjoy some strong prices throughout 
almost the entire year. Producers did not farrow as many sows last fall as 
they had planned and we don't know yet what their farrowing intentions will 
prove out to be this spring. If they hang back like they did late last fall then 
hog prices could stay very strong indeed. But even if they farrow in greatly 
increased numbers, the pig crop will not reach the market until very late in 
the year. All this would appear to mean that if cattle and calves would like 
to have a good year there don't seem to be any interruptions that would prevent 
this from being the year. Let me tell you a little about cattle. 
We don't have as many cattle as lots of people seem to think we l1ave. 
I saw an outlook paper given at another cattlemen's association meeting just 
recently and the audience was told there's still a lot of necessary cow slaughter, 
there's too many cattle in feedlots, there will be 136 million head on farms 
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next January l, we are going to produce 123 pounds per capita this year; and 
I am here to tell you it aln't so. U. S. consumers did consume nearly 120 
pounds per capita last year and they have the money to do it again this year 
and next, and there's more of those people every day. But the meat is not going 
to be there at prices that will make them happy. 
I have seen the arithmetic on cattle condition, calf crops, cow and calf 
deaths and cow and calf slaughter for 1975. The result was that the January l, 
1976 inventory, 2 1/2 months ago, was 4 million head less than it was a year 
ago. ,\nd I have seen the arithmetic on the rate at which we are continuing to 
slaughter. We will not have 136 million head next January 1. The number has 
already turned around and while people are still thinking liquidation the time 
has already passed to start thinking about where more are going to come from. 
Next January 1 the ir• "'ntory will be closer to 126 million head than to 136. 
It may be less. 
Cattle prices right now are as low as they are likely to be this year. 
Barring the cleaning up of some immediate supplies in feedlots, there is nothing 
but the realization of what the numbers really are that keeps cattle prices from 
rising, and when people discover the liquidation is over--and overdone--prices 
will rise and they will rise fast. Unless you spend all your potential profit 
bidding up the price of calves to put in your feedlots, then this ought to be a 
pretty good year for you. 
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